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III. ELECTORAL COMPETITION IN
THE MEXICAN MEDIA
A Case Study of the Election for
Governor in the State of Michoacin
1992
SHAWN M. WADE*
I. INTRODUCTION
As the United States debates the specifics of a free trade
agreement with Mexico, the issue of democracy in this emerging
economic power has taken on new importance. Mexico may be
seen as a limited democracy, to the extent that people vote and
that multiple parties exist.1 Conversely, voting in Mexico may be
seen as a pro-forma exercise in which choices are limited by the
official ruling party-Party of the Institutional Revolution
("PRI"). The PRI has ruled the country exclusively at the national
level and almost exclusively at the state level for more than sixty
years.
This Article presents a micro-study of the critical July 12, 1992,
gubernatorial election in Michoacdin, Mexico. Although the Mexi-
can Government makes every effort to ensure the integrity of the
electoral process, it is difficult to claim that the PRI is genuinely
ready to permit challenges to its rule, especially those coming from
* Shawn Wade is a graduate student in Comparative Politics at the University of
California at Los Angeles ("UCLA"). This research was assisted by an International
Predissertation Fellowship from the Social Science Research Council and the American
Council of Learned Societies, with funds provided by the Ford Foundation. Much of the
factual information provided in this Article is based on the author's first-hand knowledge.
1. There are at least seven political parties that routinely make the ballot in Mexican
elections: (1) Party of the Institutional Revolution ("PRI"); (2) National Action Party
("PAN"); (3) Party of the Democratic Revolution ("PRD"); (4) Authentic Party of the
Mexican Revolution ("PARM"); (5) Party of the Cardenist Front for National Reconstruc-
tion ("PFCRN"); (6) Popular Socialist Party ("PPS"); and (7) Mexican Democratic Party
("PDM"). The PAN is the PRI's closest competitor to the right and endorses recent criti-
cal reforms by the party, including the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA"). The PRD is the PRI's closest competitor to the left. See infra part II.
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the left. In order to control political challengers, the Mexican Gov-
ernment attempts to control all phases of the electoral process.
These phases range from its benign control of the campaign pro-
cess, to the overwhelming advantage in resources, and even ex-
tends into the more serious manipulation of electoral institutions.
In an attempt to evaluate the true nature of the electoral pro-
cess in Mexico, this Article examines three general issues sur-
rounding the elections in the State of Michoacdn. First, this Article
will review a media study that maps the number of advertisements
placed by each political party during the preelectoral period in the
written press, on the radio, and on television. The results of the
study show an overwhelming advantage for the official party. They
also reveal interesting deviations in the weeks immediately preced-
ing the July 12 vote regarding the average number of newspaper
articles for the PRI versus those for its principal challenger.
Second, this Article will describe the way Federal Government
spending is used to influence the electorate. Federal funds poured
into the State of Michoacin, Mexico's third poorest state, after the
state voted against Mexico's current President, Carlos Salinas de
Gortari, in the 1988 Presidential elections. In only three years fol-
lowing the elections, federal funds distributed by the Programa Na-
cional de Solidaridad ("PRONASOL") 2 contributed to a five-fold
increase in spending in Michoacdn. In addition, federal funds are
given, both publicly and clandestinely, to other political parties in
the electoral competition in order to pull votes away from the
PRI's principal rivals.
Third, this Article will explore the Government's and the
PRI's control over the electoral institutions that govern the electo-
ral process in Mexico. This control ranges from sublime efforts to
dominate the personnel guarding and administering the polling
places on election day, to egregious efforts to manipulate the voter
registration list. The voter registration list is manipulated in order
to thin out the number of opposition voters and inflate the number
of voters for the official party.
2. PRONASOL is President Salinas' federal social-welfare program financed partly
by the funds garnered through the sale of state-owned enterprises. See generally DENISE
DRESSER, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO, NEOPOPULIST SOLUTIONS TO NE-
OLIBERAL PROBLEMS: MEXICO'S NATIONAL SOLIDARITY PROGRAM (1991).
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II. BACKGROUND
In 1987, the PRI experienced a significant split in its elite.
Cuauht6moc Cdrdenas, the son of Mexico's most famous modern
President, left the PRI in order to challenge Carlos Salinas de
Gortari, the PRI's candidate for President in the 1988 Presidential
elections. The results of this contest are unknown. It is widely
speculated, however, that C~rdenas received more votes than actu-
ally recorded by the official results and that he may have been the
actual winner. By fraudulently manipulating the counting process
after the elections, the Government was able to claim that Salinas
and the PRI had won with 50.36% of the votes-the smallest mar-
gin ever garnered by a PRI candidate for President.3
After months of nationwide protests, Salinas took office, while
Cirdenas formed a rival political party to the left of the PRI called
the Party of the Democratic Revolution ("PRD"). Prospects for
the new party were good until it collided with the electoral
machine of the PRI. Until 1992, the PRD failed to win a Gover-
norship in Mexico. This is an important office because it serves as
the fundamental control mechanism for the administration of fed-
eral funds in individual states.
In 1992, elections for Governor were scheduled to take place
in the State of Michoacin. This state is important for many rea-
sons: it is the birth place of Cdrdenas and his famous father, Ldzaro
Cirdenas; it is the state where Ldzaro served as Governor before
becoming President; and it is the state where Cuauht6moc, repre-
senting the PRI, served as Governor from 1980 to 1986. During
the 1988 elections, the PRD had shown itself to be a serious chal-
lenger in Michoacin by winning mayoral elections in over half of
the municipalities and electing two Senators to the Federal
Government.
Nonetheless, the PRD's electoral advantage in Michoacin de-
creased after 1988. This downfall was due, in part, to PRI's manip-
ulation of the electoral system and the five-fold federal spending
following the state's support for Cuauht6moc Cirdenas in the 1988
Presidential elections.4
3. For accounts of electoral fraud, see Andrew Reding, Mexico at Crossroads: The
1988 Election and Beyond, 5 WORLD POL'Y J. 615 (1988); Andrew Reding, Mexico Under
Salinas: A Facade of Reform, 6 WORLD POL'Y J. 685 (1989).
4. For an analysis of recent voting trends in the State of Michoacin, see Elecciones
en Chihuahua y Michoacdn, NEXOS, June 1992.
1994]
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By all accounts, the election was to be an interesting one and a
serious case by which to judge President Salinas' stated commit-
ment to the democratization of Mexico.
III. THE MEDIA
The financing of political parties in Mexico is ostensibly pub-
lic. Each party meeting a series of minimal requirements
5 is
awarded, among other things, a specified quantity of media access
on public television and radio stations. The quantity corresponds
to the electoral percentage attained in the most recent federal elec-
tion. The individual state policies largely parallel federal practices
for media access during electoral periods.
The Federal Electoral Institute ("IFE") is the Mexican institu-
tion that governs electoral procedures. 6 Through the preelectoral
period for the 1991 federal elections, it reported that, on both radio
and television, each of the ten registered political parties adver-
tised at least 19 hours and 58 minutes.7 The PRI, however, while
advertising the most, only ran 26 hours and 28 minutes worth of
spots.8 The PRI's nearest rival, the PRD, ran nearly 23 hours of
radio advertising. 9
The equal radio time would appear to indicate a parity be-
tween the parties in this area. The official allocation and record of
radio and television time, however, does not include the purchase
of advertising allowed above that provided without charge.' 0 Fur-
thermore, access to newspapers is not regulated by the IFE. Ob-
servations and interviews conducted with the three branches of the
Mexican media prior to the July 12, 1992, campaign in Michoacin
illustrate an entirely different picture of electoral competition in
this medium.
A. Newspapers
Measuring the level at which particular parties are able to "ad-
vertise" in the written press is difficult in Mexico. To complicate
5. The requirements include filing a statement of purpose, a platform, and demon-
strating sufficient public support. Public support is generated through a series of public
meetings in which a notary verifies a minimum attendance. C.O.F.I.P.E. arts. 22-35 (Mex.).
6. Prerogativas del registro de partidos, NEXOS, January 1992, at 94.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 95.
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matters further, paid advertisements are often not identified as
such but published as if they were articles written by independent
reporters. Although this phenomenon is not as prevalent in the
"national newspapers" of Mexico City, even at this level, La Jor-
nada is the only national paper to identify articles called in by par-
ticular parties-as opposed to reported by individual reporters-
by placing them in italics. In local newspapers, those most signifi-
cant outside of Mexico City, there is almost no criterion by which
one can judge whether or not a particular article is legitimate or a
political advertisement. In order to determine fairly the newspaper
access of each party, the average number of paragraphs, articles
and/or reports, and photographs for each party were counted.
In Michoacin, there is one predominant source of newspaper
information-La Voz de Michoacdn. For three reasons, this paper
plays a primary role in Michoacin elections. First, it is the only
newspaper received throughout the state, while the others are
found exclusively in the capital city of Morelia. Second, it outranks
all other papers in circulation with an average daily printing of
50,000 copies." Third, because the state is one of the most rural in
the nation, its constituents depend on newspapers, as opposed to
television or radio, for information.
The following three charts graph the weekly average of (1)
paragraphs devoted to each party in the election, (2) articles and/or
reports published about each party, and (3) black-and-white photo-
graphs relating to each party printed during the seven weeks pre-
ceding the July 8, 1992, official end-of-campaign date.12
11. La Voz's nearest competitor is El Sol de Morelia with a daily circulation of 20,000,
and the nearest national competitor is La Jornada with a daily circulation of 1,000.
12. The author did not graph color photos because, during the entire preelectoral
period, the PRI received all color photos (41) except two received by the PRD.
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At least two observations should be noted. First, the PRI held
more than a two-to-one advantage in all three categories at almost
all times, except two weeks during which the PRD and the PRI had
almost the same amount of photos. This deviation, however, is ex-
plained by the fact that, during these two weeks, the PRD received
a great deal of negative press, principally through photos, in the
PRI's effort to cast the party as one of violence. At all other times,
the PRD, the PRI's strongest challenger, was closer to all the other
political parties.13
Second, during the week immediately preceding the election,
the PRI enjoyed greater coverage in all three categories, while its
nearest competitor, the PRD, fell in all three. All the other parties
increased their final week coverage. 14
B. Television
There are two local television stations in the State of Michoa-
cain. The public station ("Channel 2") provides advertising for
political parties at a federally-mandated discount rate. The private
station ("Channel 13"), however, has the larger viewership of the
two in the state. The following charts map the total number of
spots purchased by each party during the entire electoral campaign
on each of the two channels.
Channel 2:
Party % Start Date End Date Per Day Total
PRI 52.7 May 1 July 8 8 552
PAN 6.7 June 1 July 8 4 152
PARM 1.2 May 15 July 8 7 385
PFCRN 1.7 June 25 July 8 8 112
PRD 36.5 no ads run
% = percent polled in July 12, 1992, elections
13. The other parties had failed to poll over seven percent of the electorate
individually.
14. At this point, this Article might also have included a similar analysis for La Voz de
Michoacdn's nearest competitor, El Sol de Morelia. Because the differences between the
PRI and the other parties, especially the PRD, are even more skewed (1,116 total
paragraphs for the PRI as opposed to 165 for the PRD), however, and as El Sol is not
circulated outside the capital city of Morelia, the point seems redundant.
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Channel 13: Per Day on Total
Party % Start Date End Date July 8 $ Spent
PRI 52.7 May July 8 14 59,016.00
PAN 6.7 May July 8 4 4,918.00
PARM 1.2 ? July 8 5 9,836.00
PRD 36.5 no ads run
% = percent polled in July 12, 1992, elections
The PRI's dominance in the area of media advertising is more
apparent than it is in the area of print advertising. On Channel 2,
all parties except the PRD purchase only the time allowed at the
subsidized rates. This generally shows that Channel 13 is a much
more popular channel than the public station. If Channel 2 rates
were not subsidized, party funds would only be spent on Channel
13. Still, the PRI averaged fourteen spots per day on Channel 13,
dominating its nearest competitor on a per day basis. In addition,
the PRI started advertising far earlier than its opponents. Thus, in
terms of the gross number of advertisements, the PRI clearly
dominated.
Finally, the PRI's most significant rival, the PRD, did not ad-
vertise on television at all. A PRD campaign official explained this
phenomenon in terms of constituency and cost. The PRD's constit-
uency is largely rural and poor. Because few poor rural families
have televisions, television advertising, even at subsidized rates, is
inefficient.
C. Radio
Aside from their coverage in La Voz de Michoacdn, PRD con-
siders radio to be its most effective form of political access to the
electorate. Radio is considered most effective because it reaches
the primary target of the party-the rural poor, which represents
thirty percent of the electorate. Before beginning research into ra-
dio advertising in the state, the author expected to find that, at
least in this category, the PRD would be competitive with the PRI.
The results of the study, however, demonstrate that the PRI main-
tains a large advantage over its rivals in radio advertising as well.
This advantage is achieved both at the daily level and the gross
level. The PRI began its radio advertising campaign before any
other party and maintained a superior level throughout the cam-
paign. The PRD, on the other hand, began its radio advertising
[Vol. 16:351
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late and did not agree with the largest radio chain in the state re-
garding the number of advertisements it wanted to run, at what
cost, and on what stations. Even the PRD's radio consultant con-
sidered the number of spots purchased and their primary use in the
final weeks of the campaign to be an inefficient strategy. Given the
cost of a radio campaign, however, no party, other than the PRI,
has the option of running an effective ad campaign for the entire
five-month electoral period.
RADIO SPOTS BY PARTY
1 5
Party Start Day End Day Per Day Total Spots
PRI April 14 July 8 25 2,456
PAN June 16 July 8 9 207
PARM May 18 July 8 15 780
PFCRN March 14 March 18 2 8
PRD June 29 July 8 15-50* 308
* 15 per day from June 29 through July 6, and between 19 and 50 from July 6 to July 8.
If the PRI were merely the strongest party in the country with
financial strength achieved by legitimate fundraising activities, one
might make the argument that the lack of competitiveness in media
access was merely a reflection of the population's strong prefer-
ences for the official party. This, however, is not the case. In fact,
the PRI and the Government as an institution are difficult to dis-
tinguish. Sources of campaign financing are not a matter of public
record. Although it is difficult to prove, anecdotal evidence
strongly indicates that the party is funded largely through its role as
Government. In short, government resources are commingled with
party resources. This advantage is reflected in the large disparity
of media access.
Although no party made its campaign spending a matter of
public record (the National Action Party ("PAN") offered to, if
others complied), estimates this author received from the PRD di-
rectly and from various other sources indicate that the PRI out-
spent its nearest rival by six to ten times.16
15. This study includes all PRD spots purchased. Only those PRI spots purchased on
the largest chain of radio stations in the state were available. The number of PRI spots
purchased statewide could actually be much higher.
16. The sources indicate that the PRD spent 5 million U.S. dollars, as compared to 30
to 50 million U.S. dollars spent by the PRI. Interview with Alfonso Millan, PRD Cam-
paign Advisor, at Morelia, Michoacdn (July 1, 1992). The Mexican periodical Proceso
1994]
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IV. FEDERAL FUNDS
A. Solidarity
During the 1988 Presidential elections, a new system of com-
puter-operated ballot-counting was introduced in Mexico, which
promised to expedite the electoral process. Yet, as this system be-
gan to yield results that were not favorable to the PRI, it conve-
niently failed. Institutions controlled by the Government and the
official party took over the counting process, announcing a PRI
victory more than a week after election day.17 Election results in
few states were announced before the system failed, however. Mi-
choacin's results favored Cuauht6moc Cirdenas. The PRI was
served a warning that the state favored an opposition candidate
and that future elections in the state might serve to solidify the
position of the opposition party.
In its own tried and true fashion, the PRI attempted to address
this problem with financial resources instead of repression. Shortly
after his inauguration, Salinas announced the formation of
PRONASOL, or Solidarity, a social welfare spending program fi-
nanced partly by funds garnered through the sale of state-owned
enterprises. Not surprisingly, the State of Michoacin stood at the
top of the list of benefactors of the new program. From 1989 to
1991, Michoacin received nearly 300 million U.S. dollars in Soli-
darity funds, making it the top-ranking recipient in the nation. In
addition, other federal funds also poured into the state's general
account, creating an eight-fold increase in federal financing.18
gives a conservative estimate of the PRI's spending of 66 to 67 million U.S. dollars. Sa-
muel Miynez Puente, Incredulidad, PRocaso, July 20, 1992, at 35.
17. Andrew Reding, Mexico at a Crossroads: The 1989 Election and Beyond, 4
WORLD POL'Y J. 616 (1988).
18. Carlos Acosta, Con su Apresuramiento del Lunes 13, Salinas Culmin6 su Interven-
ci6n en Chihuahua y Michoacdn, PRocaso, July 20, 1992, at 12.
[Vol. 16:351362
Mexican Election Law Symposium
Solidarity Spending in Michoacin
(in millions of dollars) 19
300 290.6
14.5
1989 1990 1991 1992
The PRI denies the claim that federal funds have been used to
influence the Michoacin electorate in its favor. The PRI asserts
that Solidarity funds in Michoacin are distributed by the local mu-
nicipalities and that, as half of them are controlled by the PRD,
either party could as easily manipulate the funds. This reply is in-
genious. In fact, municipalities only nominally administer Solidar-
ity funds. Although Solidarity funds do pass through the treasuries
19. Id.
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of municipalities, they come attached with a list of required recipi-
ents for all the funds received.20
Although one can demonstrate that municipalities in Michoa-
cdn do not control federal funds, this does not prove that these
funds come with political strings attached. Equally unconvincing is
the fact that the banner colors of the Solidarity program mimic the
official colors of the PRI and the official colors of the Mexican flag.
Furthermore, it is not persuasive to note that, in a nationally-publi-
cized speech given only seven days before the gubernatorial elec-
tion in Michoacin, Mexico's President conveniently reiterated
Michoacin's preeminence in Solidarity's funding scale. It would be
much more convincing to demonstrate that dispensing of federal
funds is manipulated to coincide with electoral periods.
Nonetheless, this approach lacks systematic examination.
What follows is a graph of Solidarity funds distributed in a particu-
lar municipality through the July 12 electoral period.
20. This data is based on interviews with a municipal president and a treasurer who
provided recipient lists and amounts that accompanied the arrival of Solidarity funds.
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B. The Other Parties
In addition to free and subsidized media access, political par-
ties in Mexico are provided public funding. Half of the fund is
shared equally among all the registered political parties, and the
other half is shared in proportion to the quantity of the electorate
they polled in the most recent federal elections. Individual states
also provide minimal public campaign funds. In real terms, the
smallest party receives somewhere in the order of one million U.S.
dollars per year.
At the national level, however, public campaign funds cannot
begin to compensate for the costs of running a political party. This
21. It should be noted that this study lacks a sufficient number of observation points.
More work is necessary before clear trends can be demonstrated.
1994] 365
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
is particularly noteworthy when a party, in order to remain regis-
tered, must poll a minimum of 1.5% of the electorate at the na-
tional level and must, therefore, run campaigns in most of the
twenty-six states. What compensates for the difference between
public funds and the real campaign cost is not fundraising but ille-
gal pay-offs from the PRI to some of the other political parties.
These pay-offs ensure the facade of a multi-party democracy in
Mexico as well as draw votes away from serious PRI rivals.
In Michoacin, a small political party known as the Party of
the Cardenist Front for National Reconstruction, or Frente
Cardenista ("PFCRN"), serves as an example of how the PRI
manipulates small parties against serious political challengers.
The PFCRN made its first move by soliciting the defection of a
leading PRD figure who was disgruntled after being a front run-
ning candidate for nomination as the party's gubernatorial candi-
date and losing. By enticing a defector away from the PRD with
financial resources provided by the Government, the PFCRN ac-
complished three things. First, it weakened the PRD by stealing
away political talent. Second, it made the PRD look as if it were
run by opportunists. Finally, it took votes away from the PRD by
recruiting an ex-PRD mayoral candidate who received the largest
share of votes in the state's second largest city. This small party
also ran the defector as their gubernatorial candidate, thereby
maximizing the damage.
As its primary goal, the PFCRN and its candidate, Octaviano
Alanis, were to hound the PRD and try to portray it as the party of
violence.22 The methods used by the PFCRN to harass the PRD
are informative. Using PRI resources, the PFCRN organized gar-
bage collectors of Michoacin's capital-Morelia-who were en-
gaged in a dispute with the city's mayor, who was a member of the
PRD. By organizing these independent collectors who had been
dumping illegally, the PFCRN was able to afford them protection
and thwart the PRD mayor's efforts to resolve the illegal dumping
problem. The PFCRN, in an effort to portray the mayor as ineffec-
tive in resolving critical problems, collected a mountain of trash
22. The State of MichoacAn has the second most political violence in Mexico. Thus,
political violence has become one of the primary campaign issues in MichoacAn. One non-
governmental organization, the Convergencia, found, in a sample of 605 written press arti-
cles, that the PRD was mentioned 42 times negatively and only twice positively, while the
PRI was mentioned 35 times positively and only 10 times negatively. Source on file with
author.
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and dumped it on the porch of the mayor's home. The mayor was
politically immobilized, as any response would have required po-
lice assistance, and police involvement would have played into the
PRI's (and the PFCRN's) scheme to portray the PRD as undemo-
cratic and violent.
Whether federal funds are manipulated to maximize political
gain through their timely disbursement or through the disguise of
smaller political parties, government funds are a political tool
wielded by the PRI in its administrative role. Because the PRI's
rival parties rarely gain control over whole states or governor-
ships,23 the opposition does not have the opportunity to control
federal funds.
V. ELECTORAL INSTITUTIONS
A. Voting Places
At the beginning of each electoral period, twenty percent of
the electorate is chosen at random to attend classes that educate
them on the electoral process. These chosen citizens then take an
examination that ranks them based on their knowledge of the elec-
toral administration process. Those who rank at the top of their
class are chosen to administer their local polling place as presidents
and secretaries. In addition, each party has the right to nominate
two registered citizens to serve as one of the two scrutinizers of the
electoral process in each voting place. From a pool of up to four-
teen, two scrutinizers are chosen on the same test score basis as the
president and secretary. Finally, each party is allowed to guard
each polling place with a party representative. 24
Again, by the letter of the law, one might expect that the
above process would lead to an equitable distribution of polling
place administrators according to party. This is especially true in a
state where the dominant party polls only 52.7% of the electorate
and its nearest rival 36.5%.25 In reality, however, the PRI controls
the staffing of polling places by manipulating the selection process.
23. Even the PAN, in its best year, has only held three governorships.
24. LEY ELECTORAL DEL ESTADO DE MICHOACAN DE OCAMPO art. 26(e) (Mex.).
25. These percentages represent the results posted in the July 12, 1992, gubernatorial
race.
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A survey of officials working in two randomly-chosen dis-
tricts26 demonstrates the control exercised by the PRI. The
number of polling place officials who repeat their position from the
previous election is particularly indicative, given that the odds of
repeating as a polling official in two successive elections are very
slight.27 For example, in District VI (Municipality of Uruapan), 61
of the 300 (approximately 20.0%) polling places were staffed by
the same officers in 1991 and 1992. In terms of official polling
place positions, 75 of the 284 (approximately 28.0%) were filled by
the same individuals in 1991 and 1992. Similarly, in District I (ur-
ban area of Morelia), 117 of approximately 300 (39.0%) voting
places were staffed by the same officers in 1991 and 1992. Further-
more, the number of total polling place officials who served in 1991
and 1992 was 212 out of 1,200 (17.6%).
Because the author was not able to do a study for more than
two elections, he could not confirm that the same individuals who
served in 1991 and 1992 had also served in the previous elections.
While the odds of serving consecutively in two elections are one in
ten, the odds for three elections would be greater. In the polling
places the author observed, the same individuals who worked as
secretaries or scrutinizers were the same individuals who had
served as such for the past ten to fifteen years, a truly incredible
coincidence.
Additionally, a study done by the Convergence of Civil Orga-
nizations for Democracy, or Convergencia, a group of nongovern-
mental organizations, confirms the PAN and the PRD's argument
that polling place administrators are almost exclusively members of
the PRI. For example, in District III (Pitzcuaro), the number of
polling place presidents who were active PRI members was 122 out
of 157 (77%), while the nearest opposition party, the PRD, had
only 10 (6%). The PRI also dominated the secretary position with
107 out of 157 (68%), while the PRD had only 9 (or 6%). Further-
more, the PRI supporters held 100% of the positions responsible
for selecting and testing the randomly-chosen citizens.
26. This survey is based on the available information and does not account for all the
districts, as not all districts were monitored.
27. Actually, the odds of being selected in two successive electoral periods in the
twenty percent random group is one in ten; however, as skill is also a factor, odds cannot
be calculated.
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B. The Electoral Registry
Two types of problems exist with regards to the registration
process of electors in Michoacin. First, there are multiple errors in
the list of eligible electors, ranging from unregistered eligible vot-
ers to dead individuals registered. Second, there exist errors in the
list which might indicate manipulation of the registry in favor of a
particular party.
Of the first type, there is no shortage of examples. In District
III (Pitzcuaro), 689 citizens did not live in the indicated residences,
126 registered voters were dead, 52 registered voters never re-
ceived voting credentials, 568 registered voters lived in the United
States, and 246 citizens did not receive any official reply after re-
questing to be registered.28
In addition, the Centro de Estudios de la Sociedad Mexicana
examined a random sample of 719 names on the registry of voters
in the capital city of Morelia.2 9 They found that: 44.0% of the reg-
istered voters did not live in the address indicated; 1.2% of the
registered voters were already dead; and 6.4% of the registered
voters had false addresses.
These errors do not constitute fraud, nor do they indicate in-
tentional manipulation of the electoral registry. On the whole,
they indicate a margin of error in the electoral registry of between
10 and 11%.30 In the context of the final results of the election for
Governor, the margin of error cannot cover the margin of victory
for the PRI. In various districts within the state, however, the mar-
gin of victory for the winning party falls within the margin of error
for the electoral registry-eight out of eighteen to be exact. Be-
cause state representatives come from these districts, one can see
the critical nature of the margin of error in this context.
With regards to the second form of electoral registry errors-
manipulation towards the ends of benefiting a specific party, no
conclusive evidence is available. For example, various counties
within the state have voter registries that list more citizens than
actually live in these counties. In five counties, inflated registries
28. This information is based on registry checking procedure conducted by PRD stu-
dent-employees.
29. CuAuHTEmoc RIVER GODINEZ, CENTRO DE EsTuDIOS DE LA SOCIEDAD MEXI-
CANA, MICHOACAN: DERECHOS POLmIcos Y PACTOS DE CIVLIDAD 6 (1992).
30. These are the exact figures for the capital city of Morelia.
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ranged from 103.5% of the total population to 117.5%.31 These
counties, however, are not exclusively strongholds of the PRI. In
fact, in three of the counties, neither party dominates, and the
PRD receives at least 40% of the vote.
32
Similarly, in eight counties, the electoral registry fails to regis-
ter between 22.8% and 44.6% of eligible voters. Of these eight
counties, one is predominantly PRI, three are predominantly PRD,
and four are areas in which either party could win.33 In one county
with a 31.4% rate of registry exclusion, the margin of victory for
the PRI in the recent election was 952 votes, or 3.6%. Signifi-
cantly, in all but two of the eight counties indicated, the amount of
non-registration is able to cover the PRI's margin of victory.
Finally, there is anecdotal evidence that the electoral institu-
tions in the state manipulate the voter registry. Since the 1989
state election,34 the voter registration list has shown a marked de-
cline in the number of registered voters measured against the
number of those who are eligible to vote.
31. GODINEZ, supra note 29, at 5.
32. Press conference held by Michoacn's Consejo Estatal Electoral ("CEE") at
Morelia, Michoacdn (July 23, 1992).
33. In the 1991 elections, the PRD received 40 to 49% of the vote.
34. The 1989 election was the first state election that actually measured the strength
of the PRD with its victories in over half of the municipalities.
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Problems surrounding the registration process in Mexico
would be more conclusive if one could demonstrate that: (1) only
opposition party supporters are excluded from the voter registry;
(2) only they fail to receive their voter credential cards; or (3) in
areas where the registry exceeds the number of eligible voters, ex-
tra voter credentials are given to PRI supporters who vote repeat-
edly. Although these practices have taken place in the past,
elections in contested areas of Mexico are falling under increasing
international scrutiny, and these kinds of activities, if they still oc-
cur, are much more closely guarded.
35. GoDiNEz, supra note 29, at 6.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Studying electoral fraud in Mexico has been almost a pastime
for many researchers and journalists. Today, however, the kinds of
obvious manipulations of the electoral system seem to be disap-
pearing in favor of other forms of control. Most importantly, the
PRI dominates its rivals with resources received and disbursed in
its official capacity as the ruling members of the Government.
Even if the process of voting was entirely free of errors or inten-
tional manipulation, it would still be difficult to claim that the
country was democratic. The framework of electoral competition
is anything but legitimate.
At this point, it appears that the PRI is attempting to persuade
the international community of its democratization by allowing vic-
tories by the PAN. Yet, the PRI uses virtually all means to annihi-
late its primary rival to the left, the PRD, which presents a much
more fundamental challenge to the PRI's proposed reforms. In
any case, the democratization of Mexico is not a foregone conclu-
sion, nor is it obvious that the country is headed in this direction.
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